论公司僵局及其司法救济制度
发布时间:2018-05-05 14:37
本文选题:公司僵局 + 司法解散 ; 参考:《复旦大学》2011年硕士论文
【摘要】:公司作为重要的商事主体,在社会生活中发挥着越来越重要的作用。然而,公司僵局作为公司的致命伤将严重阻碍公司发展。随着我国经济的不断发展,公司僵局问题也越来越多,并逐渐成为公司运作中的一个不可忽视的棘手问题。因此,寻求公司僵局解决之道就成为公司法的一个现实课题。 《中华人民共和国公司法》(以下简称《公司法》)第183条,规定了司法解散作为解决公司僵局的司法介入方式,虽然该规定为公司僵局的司法救济提供了法律依据,但是其规定过于概括,操作性不强。此后的司法解释有一定程度的完善,但聚焦点依然在司法解散。笔者认为,司法解散是一种最严厉的破解公司僵局的方式,它将结束公司生命,因此应该谨慎使用。笔者通过评析两大法系法律制度和司法实践,借鉴先进经验,以提出适应我国现实需要的救济制度。 本文共分为五章: 第一章是公司僵局的表现及成因分析。公司僵局在实务中主要表现为股东会僵局和董事会僵局,表决权均等僵局和否决权僵局。公司僵局对公司利益、公司股东利益、债权人利益以及社会利益造成了巨大的损害。通过对公司僵局表现及危害的分析,得出人合性的缺失、资本多数决原则、资本不变原则的僵化和不合理的股权结构是造成公司僵局的主要原因。 第二章是公司僵局司法救济理论探讨。通过对期待利益落空理论、社会责任理论、信义义务理论和填补公司合同“缝隙”理论的分析,论述了司法介入公司僵局的合理性和必要性。分析了司法介入公司僵局应当遵循的私力救济原则、尽量维持公司主体资格原则、区分介入与有限介入原则。 第三章是公司僵局司法救济制度域外借鉴。两大法系国家在实务中对公司僵局问题的解决有着丰富的经验,英美法系强制股权置换、任命破产管理人或监管人、任命临时董事、法院的“直接司法管理权”的做法可以给予我们有益的借鉴。大陆法系国家在司法解散之外,还确立了股东退出公司和除名制度。 第四章是我国公司僵局的处理现状透析。通过引入两则典型案例,分析了我国司法介入公司僵局的现状。通过分析案例,剖析我国司法救济制度的不足,主要包括实体法上的缺陷和程序法上的制度缺漏。 第五章是完善我国公司僵局司法救济制度的建议。通过分析我国完善司法救济应遵循的原则,提出两方面的建议:其一是对司法解散制度进行完善,包括实体法和程序法两部分。其二是在司法解散之外,引入其他司法救济方式,主要有强制股权置换制度、强制公司分立制度、引入临时管理人制度等。
[Abstract]:As an important business subject, the company plays a more and more important role in the social life. However, the corporate deadlock, as a fatal injury to the company, will seriously impede the development of the company. With the continuous development of our economy, the problem of corporate deadlock is becoming more and more, and it has gradually become a difficult and difficult problem to be ignored in the operation of the company. Finding a solution to the company deadlock has become a realistic topic of company law.
The 183rd article of the People's Republic of China Company Law (hereinafter referred to as the company law) stipulates judicial dissolution as the judicial intervention to resolve the company deadlock. Although the provision provides legal basis for the judicial relief of the company deadlock, its provisions are too broad and not strong enough. The focus is still in judicial dissolution. The author thinks that judicial dissolution is the most severe way to break the deadlock of the company. It will end the company's life, so it should be used carefully. The author, through the evaluation and analysis of the legal system and judicial practice of the two legal systems, draws on the advanced experience, and puts forward the relief system that adapts to the actual needs of our country.
This article is divided into five chapters.
The first chapter is the performance and cause analysis of the corporate deadlock. The company deadlock is mainly manifested in the deadlock of the shareholders' meeting and the deadlock of the board of directors, the equal deadlock of the voting rights and the deadlock of the veto. The corporate deadlock has caused great damage to the interests of the company, the shareholders' interests of the company, the interests of the creditors and the social interests. The analysis of harm comes to the conclusion that the lack of human nature, the principle of capital majority, the rigidity of the principle of capital changeover and the irrational ownership structure are the main causes of the corporate deadlock.
The second chapter is about the theory of judicial relief in corporate deadlock. Through the analysis of the theory of expectant interest loss, the theory of social responsibility, the theory of faith obligation and the "gap" theory to fill the company contract, the rationality and necessity of judicial intervention in the deadlock of the company are discussed. The principle of private relief should be followed by the judicial intervention in the deadlock of the company. We should maintain the principle of corporate qualification and distinguish between intervention and limited intervention.
The third chapter is an extraterritorial reference for the judicial relief system of the corporate deadlock. The two law system countries have rich experience in solving the problem of corporate deadlock, the compulsory equity replacement in the Anglo American law system, the appointment of the bankruptcy administrator or the supervisor, the appointment of temporary directors, and the "direct judicial management right" of the court can give us useful reference. Besides the judicial dissolution, the civil law countries also established the system of Shareholders Withdrawing from the company and delisting.
The fourth chapter is the analysis of the current situation of corporate deadlock in China. Through the introduction of two typical cases, this paper analyzes the current situation of our judicial intervention in the deadlock of the company. Through the analysis of cases, the deficiency of our judicial relief system is analyzed, mainly including the defects in the substantive law and the lack of system on the procedural law.
The fifth chapter is the suggestion to perfect the judicial relief system of the company deadlock in our country. Through the analysis of the principles to be followed in our country's judicial relief, two suggestions are put forward: one is to improve the judicial dissolution system, including the two parts of the substantive law and the procedural law. The other is to introduce other judicial relief methods in addition to the judicial dismissal. Mandatory equity replacement system, mandatory separation of companies, the introduction of a temporary administrator system.
【学位授予单位】:复旦大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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