国有公司“内部人控制”问题研究
本文选题:公司法 + 公司治理 ; 参考:《湖南师范大学》2013年硕士论文
【摘要】:我国国有公司指的是含有国家出资的公司,它包括国有独资公司、国有控股公司及国有参股公司。内部人控制指的是公司内部人(行使公司经理职权的人员)实际上掌握了公司控制权的现象。虽然内部人控制曾一度对我国国有公司的发展起过积极的作用,但是国有公司缺乏健全的监督机制,内部人职权过大,容易失控,引发“内部人控制”问题。“内部人控制”问题作为公司治理中的一个重要课题,不仅关涉到国有公司内部权力的配置与平衡,而且关涉到国有公司未来改革与发展的方向。因此,对国有公司“内部人控制”问题做深入的分析和研究很有必要。 通过分析研究,不难发现,国有公司“内部人控制”问题是对法理学公平原则的背离,是对商法效率原则的违反,是对公司法保护股东与公司合法权益原则及利益平衡原则违背。国有公司“内部人控制”的问题主要表现在经营管理、财产使用、人事任用等方面。它是公司内部人不履行忠实勤勉之义务、不得侵占公司财产之义务以及善良管理人之义务,给国有公司造成极大的危害:一是提高了国有公司的代理成本,二是降低了国有公司的经济效率,三是影响了国有公司的可持续发展。国有公司内部人控制问题的形成主要有四种原因:(一)国有公司产权制度的不完善;(二)公司内部治理结构的不健全;(三)公司所有权与经营权的分离;(四)人类理性经济人的本性。 作为一个对国有公司“内部人控制”的问题的研究,就应当指明该问题的治理路径,消弭“内部人控制”问题对公司所造成的诸多危害。保护国有公司的整体利益及股东的合法权益,同时,保障国有资产的保值与增值。因此,从内部法律的治理路径来说,国有公司“内部人控制”问题的治理,首先应当完善我国国有公司是治理结构;其次应当健全职工参与公司治理制度;最后应当完善国有公司出资人制度。从外部市场的治理路径来说也有三种路径:一是产权市场机制;二是公司控制权市场机制;三是产品、资本及经理人才市场机制。
[Abstract]:A state owned company in China refers to a company funded by a state, which includes a wholly state-owned company, a state holding company and a state-owned stock company. The insider control refers to the fact that the insider (the personnel exercising the authority of the company manager) has actually mastered the control of the company. Although the insider controls once on the state owned company of our country. It has played a positive role, but the state-owned company lacks a sound supervision mechanism, the internal people's power is too big and it is easy to lose control. The issue of "insider control" is an important issue in the corporate governance. It not only concerns the allocation and balance of the internal power of the state-owned companies, but also concerns the state owned companies. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct in-depth analysis and Research on the "insider control" of state-owned companies.
Through the analysis and research, it is not difficult to find that the "insider control" problem of the state-owned companies is a departure from the principle of jurisprudence and the violation of the principle of commercial law efficiency. It is a violation of the principle of protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the shareholders and the company and the principle of balance of interests. The problem of the "insider control" of the state-owned companies is mainly manifested in the management and management. Production use, personnel appointment and other aspects. It is the duty of the internal people of the company to not fulfill the duty of loyal and diligent, not to occupy the duty of the company's property and the obligation of the good manager, and cause great harm to the state-owned company. One is to improve the agency cost of the state-owned company, two is to reduce the economic efficiency of the state-owned company, and the three is to influence the state-owned public. The sustainable development of the company. There are four main reasons for the formation of the internal control problem in the state-owned company: (1) the imperfection of the property right system of the state-owned companies; (two) the unsound internal governance structure of the company; (three) the separation of the ownership of the company and the right of management; (four) the nature of the human rational economy.
As a study of the "insider control" of the state-owned companies, it is necessary to point out the way to control the problem, to eliminate the harm caused by the "insider control" problem to the company, to protect the overall interests of the state-owned companies and the legitimate rights and interests of the shareholders, and to guarantee the value and value of the state-owned assets. Therefore, the internal law is from the internal law. For the governance path, the governance of the "insider control" problem of the state-owned companies should first improve the governance structure of the state owned companies in our country; secondly, we should improve the employees' participation in the corporate governance system; finally, we should improve the investor system of the state-owned companies. There are also three ways for the management of the external market: the first is the property market. Mechanism; two, corporate control market mechanism; three, product, capital and managerial talent market mechanism.
【学位授予单位】:湖南师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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