论我国股东派生诉讼约束机制

发布时间：2018-06-29 04:01

本文选题：股东派生诉讼 + 约束机制　；参考：《内蒙古大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】： 2005年我国在修订《公司法》时终于在法律中明确规定了保护中小股东利益的股东派生诉讼制度。我国股东派生诉讼制度的规定尚属简单,其中对如何约束原告股东不正当提起诉讼、防止原告股东滥诉在立法上没有做出明确的规定,在实践中很可能出现股东派生诉讼制度被不正当使用或滥用的情形。也由于该制度本身的缺陷,股东有时为了私利或被他人诱使不能恰当的运用该制度解决纠纷,可能会出现股东派生诉讼制度在运用过程中偏离“正轨”的情形,由此而引起的问题必须及时解决。股东派生诉讼约束机制是摒弃股东派生诉讼被不正当使用或滥用的最好方法。股东派生诉讼约束机制不是绝对的限制股东提起派生诉讼,而是为了平衡公司与股东之间、大小股东之间的利益而设立的。为了更好的发挥股东派生诉讼制度的优势,应该设置更严格的约束条件,防止投机诉讼或恶意诉讼的发生。股东派生诉讼约束机制的确立和完善对更好的发挥股东派生诉讼防范利益冲突和保护中小股东的利益有着重要的意义。本文将主要以我国《公司法》为背景并结合外国的先进经验,从法律对原告股东的约束和在公司意思自治前提下公司对原告股东提起派生诉讼的约束来阐述我国股东派生诉讼约束机制。第一部分,主要介绍股东派生诉讼制度。通过对派生诉讼制度的历史发展、内涵的认识和理解,才能明晰股东派生诉讼制度设立的作用,才可以进一步认识到设立股东派生诉讼约束机制的重要性。第二部分,主要论述建立股东派生诉讼约束机制的必要性。股东派生诉讼的目的是保护小股东的利益,但不能因此扩大小股东的权利,应在约束与激励中寻找平衡点,在特定的条件下合理地运用小股东的监督权,这才符合派生诉讼设立的目的。第三部分,通过从法律规定和公司终止诉讼权利两个方面来论述股东派生诉讼约束机制。第一小部分,主要结合各国先进的立法、实践经验,论述我国股东派生诉讼约束机制中对原告股东的约束,并探讨如何对其进行完善。首先,从原告的股东资格的认定方面,对符合提起诉讼的三个资格标准进行探讨：一是原告是与诉讼利益相关的公司的股东；二是原告的动机要善意；三是原告能公正和充分的代表公司利益。其次,通过判决利益归属的明确化来约束原告股东胜诉的权利,并明确败诉原告股东的责任,限制原告和解、撤诉,防止股东因律师的利诱而提起不正当的诉讼或投机诉讼或与被告串通勾结恶意和解、撤诉损害公司的利益。最后,针对诉讼费用担保制度的完善,要求原告股东在诉讼前向公司提供费用担保,原告股东会因费用担保数额过多而谨慎提起诉讼。第二小部分,主要是在公司意思自治前提下探讨公司内部如何约束股东提起派生诉讼。公司对股东诉权的约束,主要存在两种途径：一是原告股东行使权利的前置程序,该程序从诉前有效约束股东滥诉、不正当诉讼。一是通过商业判断规则对董事等高级管理人员进行保护,赋予公司有终止诉讼的权利。商业判断规则主要是公司意思自治权的体现,公司认为董事等高级管理人员的行为符合商业判断规则的,就可以向法院提出终止诉讼的请求,法院依据诉因的不同适用不同的审查标准,并做出是否允许原告提起派生诉讼的裁决,强化公司对原告的制衡作用。
[Abstract]:In 2005, in the revision of the company law, the system of shareholder derivative litigation in the law was clearly defined in the law. The provisions of the system of shareholder derivative litigation in our country are still simple. In practice, it is likely that the shareholder derivative litigation system is misused or misused. Also, because of the defects of the system itself, the shareholders sometimes can not properly use the system to solve the dispute in order to be selfish or to be enticed by others. It may appear that the shareholder derivative litigation system deviates from the "right track" in the process of application. The shareholder derivative action constraint mechanism is the best way to abandon the improper use or abuse of the shareholder derivative action. The shareholder derivative action constraint mechanism is not absolutely restricted by the shareholders to bring the derivative action, but to balance the interests between the company and the shareholders, and the interests between the large and small shareholders. To give full play to the advantages of the shareholder derivative litigation system, more stringent constraints should be set up to prevent the occurrence of speculative litigation or malicious litigation. The establishment and improvement of the shareholder derivative action constraint mechanism is of great significance to the better play of shareholders' derivative action against the interests conflict and the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders.
This article will mainly take our country "company law" as the background and combine the advanced experience of foreign countries, from the restriction of the law to the plaintiff shareholders and the derivative action of the company to the plaintiff's shareholders under the premise of the autonomy of the company to expound the mechanism of the derivative action of the shareholders of our country.
The first part mainly introduces the shareholder derivative litigation system. Through the historical development of the derivative litigation system and the understanding and understanding of the connotation, can we clarify the role of the establishment of the shareholder derivative litigation system, and can further realize the importance of the establishment of the shareholder derivative action constraint mechanism.
The second part mainly discusses the necessity of establishing the restriction mechanism of shareholder derivative action. The purpose of the shareholder derivative action is to protect the interests of the small shareholders, but can not enlarge the rights of the shareholders, and should find the balance point in the restriction and incentive, and use the supervision right of the small shareholders reasonably under certain conditions. This is in accordance with the establishment of derivative litigation. The purpose.
The third part discusses the shareholder derivative litigation binding mechanism from two aspects: legal provisions and the company's right to terminate litigation.
The first small part, mainly combining the advanced legislation and practical experience of various countries, discusses the restriction on the shareholders of the shareholder's derivative litigation in our country, and discusses how to improve it. First, the three qualifications of the plaintiff are discussed in accordance with the qualification of the plaintiff's shareholders: first, the plaintiff is the lawsuit profit. The shareholders of a beneficial company; two is the intention of the plaintiff to be good in good faith; the three is that the plaintiff can represent the interests of the company fairly and fully. Secondly, it restricts the right of the plaintiff's shareholders to win the lawsuit through the determination of the attribution of the interests of the plaintiff, and clearly loses the responsibility of the plaintiff shareholders, restricts the plaintiff and the solution, the withdrawal of the prosecution, and prevents the shareholders from bringing up the lawyer's lure. Undue litigation or speculative action or collusion with the defendant maliciously conciliatory, the withdrawal damages the interests of the company. Finally, in view of the perfection of the litigation cost guarantee system, the plaintiff shareholders are required to provide the company with the cost guarantee before the lawsuit, and the plaintiff shareholders will bring the lawsuit carefully because of the excessive amount of the cost guarantee.
The second part is mainly to discuss how to restrain the derivative litigation within the company under the premise of the company's autonomy. There are two main ways of the company's restriction on the shareholder's right of appeal: first, the prepositional procedure of the rights of the plaintiff, the procedure from which the stock is indiscriminate and the unfair litigation. One is through commercial judgment. The rules shall protect the senior managers, such as the directors, and give the company the right to terminate the lawsuit. The rules of commercial judgment are mainly the embodiment of the autonomy of the company. The company thinks that the actions of the directors and other senior managers conform to the rules of commercial judgment, and they can put forward the request of final litigation to the court, and the court is applicable in accordance with the different application of the lawsuit. Different standards of examination, and whether to allow plaintiffs to initiate derivative action awards, to strengthen the company's checks and balances on the plaintiff.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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