双重代理关系对国有企业的低效率分析

发布时间：2018-06-29 21:15

本文选题：国企 + 双重代理关系　；参考：《东北财经大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国建立社会主义市场经济体制后,国企为了与之相适应,开始进行改革,大批国有企业建立现代企业制度试点,推行公司制、股份制改革,为建立现代企业制度进行了有益的探索。我国国企通常实行公司制度,按照《公司法》的要求,形成由股东代表大会、董事会、监事会和高级经理人员组成的相互依赖又相互制衡的公司治理结构。完善的公司治理结构可以很好的解决委托代理关系的各种弊端,促使委托人和代理人目标的一致性,进而设计出兼容性的激励机制,提高国有企业的效率。但我国国有企业建立的公司法人治理结构,与私有产权制度下的股份公司有很大的不同,所存在的委托代理关系具有复杂性和特殊性,公司治理结构不完善,双重代理关系的独特性,限制了现代企业制度有效性的发挥,进而影响了国有企业的效率。文章写作的目的,是分析我国国企独特的双重代理关系对国企效率的影响。想要说明国企独特的双重代理关系是造成国有企业低效率的原因。文章在行文过程中,分为五个部分。第一部分介绍文章的研究背景和意义,概括评价国内外学者对此问题的观点,为我文章主题的论证提供有益的借鉴。第二部分介绍几个与文章主题相关的理论,这些理论对文章主题的分析有很重要的作用。通过对理论的描述,可以将这个理论更好的运用到主题的分析中去,对于文章的架构和论证有很大作用。第三部分介绍国企中的双重委托代理关系及其存在的问题。这是文章重要的一部分,这一部分重点描述我国国有企业的双重代理关系,分析现状,通过现状描述发现这种代理关系下存在的问题。只有对我国国企存在的双重代理关系进行全面的分析,发现问题,才能为接下来的原因分析打好基础。第四部分进行原因探究。前一部分已经对双重代理关系做了详尽的分析,也发现了这种代理关系带来的问题,这一章便很自然的要对产生问题的原因进行分析。通过模型推导来论证双重代理关系的独特性是问题发生的原因。第五部分是政策建议部分。通过上面几部分的分析,已经找到了问题所在,于是在文章的最后部分,针对这些问题,提出相对应的解决对策。文章重点从国企存在的独特的双重代理关系这个角度来对主题进行分析,又使用数理模型来更好的进行原因论证,使原因分析更具说服力,以期望完整而全面的达到行文的目的,对我国国有企业效率的提高有所帮助,提高企业竞争力。
[Abstract]:After the establishment of the socialist market economic system in China, in order to adapt to the socialist market economic system, the state-owned enterprises began to carry out reforms, and a large number of state-owned enterprises set up modern enterprise systems to carry out the reform of the corporate system and the joint-stock system. It has carried on the beneficial exploration for the establishment of the modern enterprise system. The state-owned enterprises in our country usually implement the corporate system. According to the requirements of the Company Law, the corporate governance structure, which is composed of shareholders' Congress, board of directors, supervisory board and senior managers, is composed of interdependent and balanced corporate governance structure. Perfect corporate governance structure can solve all kinds of malpractice of principal-agent relationship, promote the consistency between principal and agent, and then design compatible incentive mechanism to improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises. However, the corporate governance structure established by state-owned enterprises in China is quite different from that of joint-stock companies under the system of private property rights. The principal-agent relationship is complex and special, and the corporate governance structure is not perfect. The uniqueness of dual agency relationship limits the effectiveness of modern enterprise system and affects the efficiency of state-owned enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of the unique dual agency relationship on the efficiency of state-owned enterprises. It is necessary to explain that the unique dual agency relationship of state-owned enterprises is the cause of low efficiency of state-owned enterprises. The article is divided into five parts in the process of writing. The first part introduces the research background and significance of the article, summarizes and evaluates the views of domestic and foreign scholars on this issue, and provides a useful reference for the argumentation of the theme of my article. The second part introduces several theories related to the theme of the article, which play an important role in the analysis of the theme of the article. Through the description of the theory, the theory can be better applied to the analysis of the topic, which plays a great role in the structure and argumentation of the article. The third part introduces the dual principal-agent relationship and its existing problems in state-owned enterprises. This is an important part of the article. This part mainly describes the dual agency relationship of state-owned enterprises in China, analyzes the present situation, and finds out the problems existing in this kind of agency relationship through the description of the present situation. Only through the comprehensive analysis of the dual agency relationship of state-owned enterprises in our country and finding out the problems can we lay a good foundation for the analysis of the following reasons. The fourth part explores the reasons. The first part has made the detailed analysis to the double agency relations, also discovered this kind of agency relations to bring the question, this chapter very naturally wants to carry on the analysis to the reason which produces the question. This paper demonstrates that the uniqueness of double agent relationship is the reason of the problem. The fifth part is the policy suggestion part. Through the analysis of the above several parts, the problem has been found, so in the last part of the article, in view of these problems, the corresponding solutions are put forward. This paper focuses on the analysis of the subject from the perspective of the unique dual agency relationship of state-owned enterprises, and the use of mathematical models to better reason argument, which makes the cause analysis more convincing. In order to achieve the purpose of writing in a complete and comprehensive way, it is helpful to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of state-owned enterprises in China.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F276.1

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