政党官僚制、机会主义与委托代理:一个央地关系的解释框架

发布时间：2018-04-17 04:23

本文选题：政党官僚制 + 机会主义　；参考：《云南行政学院学报》2017年01期

【摘要】：中国通过政党官僚制来对经济社会生活实施有效的运作从而支撑政府的运转和公共管理的实现,政治精英的任命制度使得地方领导人选择在官僚体制内谋求职位的保持升迁。但是由于机会主义的广泛存在,政党官僚制的有效性受到极大的削弱。作为委托人的中央政府和作为代理人的地方政府效用函数存在着明显的利益差异,代理人为了追求自身利益的最大化往往突破委托人的束缚和限制。机会主义与委托代理消解了政党官僚制的权威性和有效性,其结果是央地关系上,政府的机会主义导致中央和地方利益的冲突。建国以来,地方政府的崛起成为发展趋势,十八大后中央开始了再集权化的进程。
[Abstract]:China implements the effective operation of economic and social life through the party bureaucracy to support the operation of the government and the realization of public administration. The appointment system of the political elite makes local leaders choose to keep their positions in the bureaucratic system.However, due to the widespread existence of opportunism, the effectiveness of party bureaucracy has been greatly weakened.The utility function of the central government as the principal and the local government as the agent are obviously different. In order to maximize their own interests, the agents often break through the constraints and restrictions of the principal.Opportunism and principal-agent dispel the authoritativeness and validity of political party bureaucracy. The result is that the government opportunism leads to the conflict between central and local interests in the relationship between central and local government.Since the founding of the people's Republic of China, the rise of local governments has become a development trend, and the central authorities have begun the process of recentralization after the 18th National Congress.
【作者单位】：桂林理工大学人文社会科学学院;
【基金】：桂林理工大学博士启动基金项目
【分类号】：D621

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