需求扰动不对称模式下的竞争供应链信息披露模型研究

发布时间：2018-04-03 20:11

本文选题：竞争供应链　切入点：博弈论　出处：《南京航空航天大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文基于最优化理论与博弈论的信息机制设计原理,在市场需求库诺特竞争的环境下研究了两条竞争供应链渠道成员的最优决策以及信息共享对最优决策影响的问题,本文假定每条供应链均由一个制造商和一个零售商构成.本文首先研究了扰动信息对称的情形,此时,制造商知道真实的市场需求状态.研究表明每个制造商都获得最大利润,而下游的零售商只获得保留利润.接下来本文研究了扰动信息不对称情形下的供应链信息披露机制,得到了供需双方的均衡解以及各个制造商生产计划的鲁棒区间.研究发现:无论扰动信息是否对称,制造商总是获得最大利润,零售商总是获得保留利润.而且制造商的生产计划都具有鲁棒性,即,当需求扰动量很小时,渠道的均衡解保持不变.为了防止下游的零售商偏离原计划的交易数量,此时需要采取一些特殊的措施,例如提高单位批发价等.同时,由于信息的不对称,高扰动状态下的零售商因为获得了信息租金而获得了比信息对称的情形下更高的利润.有趣的是,在鲁棒性区间内,还可以观察到一些反直觉的管理暗示.而且,研究表明库诺特竞争将导致批发价和渠道性能的降低.本文共有五章.在第一章中介绍了供应链扰动管理的研究背景和发展现状.第二章简要地介绍了委托代理理论的相关知识.第三章中研究了扰动信息对竞争供应链最优决策的影响的问题.第四章通过一些数据实验来具体说明第三章中所得的结论.第五章是对本文的总结,并做了展望.
[Abstract]:Based on the optimization theory and the information mechanism design principle of game theory, this paper studies the optimal decision of the members of two competitive supply chain channels and the influence of information sharing on the optimal decision under the environment of market demand Kurt competition.This paper assumes that each supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer.In this paper, we first study the situation of disturbance information symmetry, where manufacturers know the true state of market demand.Research shows that every manufacturer gets the most profit, while the downstream retailer gets only retained profit.Then this paper studies the information disclosure mechanism of supply chain in the case of disturbed information asymmetry and obtains the equilibrium solution of both supply and demand and the robust interval of each manufacturer's production plan.It is found that no matter whether the disturbance information is symmetrical or not, the manufacturer always gets the maximum profit, and the retailer always gets the reserved profit.Moreover, the manufacturer's production plan is robust, that is, when the demand disturbance is small, the equilibrium solution of the channel remains unchanged.In order to prevent the downstream retailers from deviating from the planned number of transactions, some special measures should be taken, such as raising the unit wholesale price and so on.At the same time, because of the asymmetry of information, the retailers in the high disturbance state get higher profits than those in the case of information symmetry because they get the information rent.Interestingly, some counter-intuitive management cues can also be observed in the robust range.Moreover, research shows that Cournot competition will lead to wholesale prices and channel performance decline.There are five chapters in this paper.In the first chapter, the research background and development status of supply chain disturbance management are introduced.The second chapter briefly introduces the principal-agent theory.In chapter 3, the influence of disturbance information on the optimal decision of competitive supply chain is studied.The fourth chapter explains the conclusion of the third chapter through some data experiments.The fifth chapter is the summary of this article, and makes the prospect.
【学位授予单位】：南京航空航天大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;O22

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