省直管县改革之制度变迁研究

发布时间：2018-03-16 03:14

本文选题：省直管县　切入点：制度变迁　出处：《重庆师范大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：为了更好地发展县域经济,消除市管县带来的弊病,我国政府提出了“省直管县”改革,其本质是政府层级改革,主要有行政性放权改革和财政性分权改革两类,财政省直管县、强县扩权、强权扩县都是省直管县改革的具体表现。本文尝试用制度经济学的理论对省直管县改革替代市管县改革做出解释。综合了凡勃伦、诺斯、青木昌彦和格雷夫的制度变迁理论,从宏观、中观和微观三个层面,根据宏观运用制度演化思想、中观运用路径依赖理论、微观运用主观博弈模型理论和自我反馈机制现象的分析线索,分析了我国省直管县改革这一制度变迁的动因、解释了改革表现多样性的原因以及改革发生的机制。制度变迁是为了获取潜在利润,即使总体的收益大于成本,也会由于改革要打破既得利益集团所维护的利益格局而遭受阻碍,所以改革不会是一帆风顺的。制度变迁的发生与否不仅取决于改革的成本与收益,还取决于改革博弈中多方参与者的实力。通过对制度变迁中多主体博弈分析可以看出,市级政府由于是利益流出者,所以会阻挠改革。县级政府由于是利益流入者,所以会支持改革。但在实际中,县级政府财权、事权听从于省级政府,而人事权却听从于市级政府,两边讨好的情形让部分县级政府为难。因此,省级政府在确保改革顺利推进的基础上,要权衡好各级政府利益得失,同时建立有效的监督激励机制,真正发挥改革的作用,让改革的实效落到实处。由于制度变迁会触动市级政府的利益,博弈分析表明县级政府在争取下放权益的过程中会受到各种“软抵抗”,那么,省直管县这类制度变迁的绩效到底如何?实证分析表明:地区人均gdp水平、财政收入、财政支出、地区总人口规模、地区社会固定资产投资、地区消费品零售额是影响是否进行两类改革的共同因素。财权改革和事权改革对县域经济绩效和财政绩效的影响总体上都是正向的。但两类改革对财政绩效和经济绩效影响的大小不同,影响的时期也不同。综合本文理论与实证分析,可以看出我国当前进行的省直管县改革取得了一定的成效,但是改革仍存在一些市级政府抵抗改革的问题,所以改革还存在进一步提升的空间。为此,对于今后的改革要结合地区实际情况,明确职能范围,健全监督机制。
[Abstract]:In order to better develop the county economy and eliminate the disadvantages brought by the city governing the county, the Chinese government has put forward the reform of "managing the county directly by the province". The essence of the reform is the reform of the government level, which mainly consists of two types: the administrative decentralization reform and the fiscal decentralization reform. This paper attempts to use the theory of institutional economics to explain the reform of the county directly in charge of the province instead of the reform of the city and county. Aoki and Graff's theory of institutional change, from the macro, meso and micro levels, according to the macro application of institutional evolution, the application of path dependence theory. Using the subjective game model theory and the analysis clue of the self-feedback mechanism phenomenon, this paper analyzes the motivation of the institutional change of the reform of the province directly in charge of the county in our country. It explains the reasons for the diversity of the performance of the reform and the mechanism by which the reform takes place. The institutional changes are aimed at generating potential profits, even if the overall benefits are greater than the costs. It will also be hindered by the reform to break the pattern of interests maintained by vested interest groups, so reform will not be smooth sailing. The occurrence of institutional changes depends not only on the costs and benefits of the reform, It also depends on the strength of the multiple participants in the reform game. Through the analysis of the multi-agent game in the institutional change, we can see that the municipal government is the outflow of benefits, so it will block the reform. So it will support reform. But in practice, the financial power of the county government is subordinate to the provincial government, while the personal power is subordinate to the municipal government, and the situation of flattering on both sides makes some county governments difficult. On the basis of ensuring the smooth progress of the reform, provincial governments should balance the benefits and losses of the governments at all levels, and at the same time establish an effective supervisory and incentive mechanism to truly play the role of reform. Since institutional changes will touch the interests of municipal governments, game analysis shows that county governments will be subjected to various "soft resistance" in the process of striving for the decentralization of rights and interests. What is the performance of this kind of institutional change in the province directly in charge of county? The empirical analysis shows that: regional per capita gdp level, fiscal revenue, fiscal expenditure, regional total population size, regional social investment in fixed assets, The regional retail sales of consumer goods are the common factors influencing the two types of reforms. The impact of the reform on the county economy and financial performance is positive, but the two types of reforms have a positive impact on the financial performance and economic performance. The impact of economic performance varies, The period of influence is also different. Based on the theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper, we can see that the current provincial and county reform in China has achieved certain results, but there are still some problems in the reform of the municipal government resistance to the reform. Therefore, there is room for further improvement in the reform. Therefore, the future reform should be based on the actual situation of the region, clear the scope of functions and improve the supervision mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：重庆师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630

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