城镇化进程中的地方政府竞争机制研究

发布时间：2018-06-13 06:54

本文选题：城镇化 + 地方政府竞争　；参考：《苏州大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：在既往的研究范式中,府际关系(包括横向与纵向两个维度)成为地方政府竞争研究的核心链条,并围绕此构建了一系列规制政府行为的宏观或中观的理论话语体系。然而,缺乏着力基点或实践载体的微观基础的探究,必然导致政策措施的空洞乏力,且缺乏竞争逻辑与外部情境之互动关系的客观理析,也会使基于理论构化的研究成果因缺乏实践基础而使地方政府产生“不接地气”的主观感知,更勿论切实地将这些成果纳入政府政策创制或行为选择之中了。因而,基于城镇化的客观情境与分析场景,以地方政府核心行动者作为地方政府竞争研究的微观切入视角,便不啻为一种必然的、可行的且切实有效的补充性范式选择。在中国的纵横向权力配置结构中,地方政府核心行动者主导着地方政府的利益视和政策选择。分权式改革是过去三十年间中国制度变迁的核心依循路径,这场以财政分权和政治集权为核心的双重渐进性体制变革,实现了地方政府核心行动者地方利益与个体利益的统一,激发了地方政府核心行动者的利益觉醒;同时,不完善的选举制度制约了社会公民的“软约束”力量,使中国地方政府竞争表现为一种自上而下的、以政绩为导向的标尺竞争,导致竞争泛化和异化。而在城镇化进程中,地方核心行动者激励机制的僵化和约束机制的弱化则会导致地方政府公共财政乱象的产生,突出表现为投资结构扭曲和地方债务失控两个方面。要有效规塑中国地方政府竞争,不仅要建立地方核心行动者的权力分配机制和行政问责机制,明确其行动体制空间并界定其行为体制边界,而且要探索新的民主形式、将社会公民纳入政府的政策议程中,建构自上而下的晋升激励与自下而上的民主协商的有机互动机制,在维持地方官员积极性的同时实现真正的“以人为本”。另外,针对城镇化进程中突出表现的公共财政乱象,要建构综合性的官员晋升考核体系,引入地方债务评估机制,以晋升锦标赛的硬约束有效规约地方政府核心行动者的利益视角和价值取向。本文的结构安排如下:在第一章,我们对研究问题的提出和依据进行了导引性论述,回顾了相关研究的进展并进行了述评,并对研究设计和文章体系架构进行了展示;在第二章,我们基于宏观的分析视角,从制度迁移出发分析了地方政府竞争衍生与演化的内在逻辑,并论述了在城镇化进程中地方政府竞争出现的新特点与新趋势;第三章是本文的核心内容,我们首先从行动空间和利益视角两个方面对地方核心行动者的实践逻辑进行了分析,然后基于委托代理的分析框架,对处于双重政治代理链条中的地方核心行动者所面临的激励和约束机制进行了解构,基于此探究了城镇化进程中地方政府竞争异化的机理及其后果(公共财政乱象);最后,本研究提出了探索性的对策建议。
[Abstract]:In the previous research paradigm, the relationship between governments (including horizontal and vertical dimensions) has become the core chain of local government competition research, and a series of macro-or meso-theoretical discourse systems to regulate government behavior have been constructed around it. However, the lack of research on the microcosmic basis of the focus or the carrier of practice will inevitably lead to the weakness of policy measures and the lack of objective analysis of the interactive relationship between competition logic and external situation. It will also cause the local government to have subjective perception of "not connecting with the ground" because of the lack of practical basis, let alone bring these achievements into government policy creation or behavior choice. Therefore, based on the objective situation and analysis scenario of urbanization, taking the core actors of local government as the microscopic angle of view of local government competition research, it is a necessary, feasible and effective complementary paradigm choice. In China's vertical and horizontal power allocation structure, the central actors of local governments dominate the interests of local governments and policy choices. The reform of decentralization is the core path of China's institutional changes in the past 30 years. This dual gradual institutional change, which takes fiscal decentralization and political centralization as the core, has realized the unification of local interests and individual interests of the core actors of local governments. At the same time, the imperfect election system restricts the "soft restraint" power of the social citizens, and makes the competition of local government in China as a top-down, performance-oriented competition. Lead to competition generalization and alienation. In the process of urbanization, the rigidity of incentive mechanism and the weakening of constraint mechanism of local core actors will lead to the chaos of local government public finance, which is manifested in two aspects: the distortion of investment structure and the runaway of local debt. In order to effectively regulate the competition of Chinese local governments, we should not only establish the power distribution mechanism and administrative accountability mechanism of local core actors, but also define the space of its action system and define the boundaries of its behavior system, and explore new forms of democracy. Social citizens should be included in the government's policy agenda, and the organic interactive mechanism of top-down promotion incentive and bottom-up democratic negotiation should be constructed to maintain the enthusiasm of local officials and realize "people-oriented" at the same time. In addition, in view of the public financial chaos that is prominent in the process of urbanization, it is necessary to construct a comprehensive official promotion appraisal system and introduce a local debt assessment mechanism. The interests and value orientation of the key actors of the local government are effectively regulated by the hard constraint of the promotion tournament. The structure of this paper is as follows: in the first chapter, we discuss the research issues and basis, review the progress and review of the relevant research, and show the research design and the architecture of the article; In the second chapter, we analyze the internal logic of local government competition from the perspective of macro analysis, and discuss the new characteristics and trends of local government competition in the process of urbanization. The third chapter is the core content of this paper. Firstly, we analyze the practical logic of the local core actors from the perspective of action space and interests, then based on the principal-agent analysis framework. This paper deconstructs the incentive and restraint mechanism faced by the local core actors in the dual political proxy chain, and explores the mechanism of local government competition alienation in the process of urbanization and its consequences (public finance chaos; finally, In this study, some tentative countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：苏州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F299.21;D630

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