城乡居民养老保险中农民决策选择的行为偏差

发布时间：2018-06-12 17:04

本文选题：城乡居民养老保险 + 决策选择　；参考：《河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2017年06期

【摘要】：2014年城乡居民养老保险实现了制度全覆盖,在自愿选择缴费档次的原则下90%农民选择最低缴费档次的行为严重制约着农民养老福利水平的提高,政府采取的财政补贴激励政策失灵。基于这种现实,构建了农民参保行为决策偏差的前景理论模型,以青年农民和中老年农民两类群体为考察对象,根据损失厌恶、参照依赖、敏感度递减等心理特性,揭示了农民参保行为偏差的响应机制。进而提出利用"可得性偏差"构建城乡居民养老保险的财政奖励机制;提高最低缴费档次,突破"锚定效应";突出框架效应的正面导向,提升城乡居保制度的绩效等政策建议。
[Abstract]:In 2014, the urban and rural residents' pension insurance system was fully covered. Under the principle of voluntary choice of the contribution level, 90% of the farmers chose the lowest contribution level, which seriously restricted the improvement of the level of the peasants' old-age welfare. The government's financial subsidy incentive policy failed. Based on this reality, the prospect theory model of decision deviation of farmers' participation behavior is constructed. Two groups of young peasants and middle-aged and old peasants are taken as the objects of investigation. According to the psychological characteristics such as loss aversion, reference dependence and decreasing sensitivity, etc. The response mechanism of farmers' behavior deviation is revealed. Then it puts forward some policy suggestions, such as constructing the financial reward mechanism of urban and rural residents' old-age insurance by using the "available deviation", raising the lowest payment level, breaking through the "anchoring effect", highlighting the positive orientation of the frame effect, and improving the performance of the urban and rural housing insurance system.
【作者单位】：河北经贸大学财政税务学院;中国人民大学财政金融学院;
【基金】：2015年河北省教育厅重大攻关项目“京津冀协同发展的财税政策研究” 国家社科基金项目“农村新型养老保险全覆盖问题研究”(13BJY088) 第二批河北省百名优秀创新人才支持计划项目“河北省农村新型养老保险全覆盖问题研究”(BR2-244)
【分类号】：F323.6;F842.67

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