基于碳排放权交易与多地方政府干预的跨区域绿色供应链链际协调研究

发布时间：2018-04-11 23:03

本文选题：跨区域绿色供应链 + 碳排放权交易　；参考：《浙江工商大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：碳排放权交易是世界各国控制温室气体排放的重要手段。目前,我国各地方政府在制定碳排放管制策略时多数基于本地经济社会发展状况分析,导致区域间存在明显的管制差异,从而影响跨区域绿色供应链的运作效率。尤其在供应链链际竞争中,政府的奖惩和碳排放权交易的减排支出或收益以及消费者的产品绿色偏好会影响供应链及其企业的最终收益。但在目前的供应链链际协调研究中,很少把这些因素考虑在模型的构建中。因此,针对绿色供应链治理的跨区域现实情况,本文建立了以政府收益为上层、链际博弈协调模型作为下层的二层规划模型,对跨区域绿色供应链在不同地方政府差异化奖惩策略下的链际协调问题进行探究。考虑绿色供应链企业碳排放水平差异,本文运用博弈理论、二层规划理论和最优化理论等,分别研究了无碳排放权交易价格和政府奖惩的企业自主减排绿色供应链链际竞争情形、有碳排放权交易价格和政府奖惩的绿色供应链链际竞争情形。并拓展至跨区域绿色供应链系统,分别建立基于Stackelberg博弈和二层规划的供应链协调模型,求解产品销售价格、单位产品碳排放量、政府奖惩水平和碳排放权交易价格的均衡解。重点分析价格弹性系数和碳减排成本系数对各供应链利润、碳排放量的影响。通过研究,得到以下结论:1)企业及供应链收益与价格弹性系数和碳减排成本系数成反比,通过降低价格弹性系数和碳减排成本系数来保障收益;2)在链际竞争中,后做决策有利于企业收益,而先做决策更有利于保证最低收益;先做决策有利于控制碳排放量,而后做决策更有利于提高碳减排效率;3)在碳减排成本系数较小时,政府对企业进行补贴能明显降低碳排放量和财政支出,此时企业进行绿色技术改造,可以较低成本获得更好的碳减排成果。
[Abstract]:Carbon emissions trading is an important means to control greenhouse gas emissions around the world.At present, most local governments make carbon emission control strategies based on the analysis of local economic and social development, which leads to obvious regional regulatory differences, thus affecting the operational efficiency of cross-regional green supply chain.Especially in the supply chain competition, government rewards and penalties, carbon emissions trading emissions reduction expenditure or revenue, and consumers' green preferences will affect the final benefits of the supply chain and its enterprises.However, in the current research of supply chain coordination, these factors are rarely considered in the construction of the model.Therefore, in view of the cross-regional reality of green supply chain governance, this paper establishes a bilevel programming model with government revenue as the upper layer and inter-chain game coordination model as the lower level.This paper probes into the interchain coordination of cross-regional green supply chain under the strategy of different local government differentiation rewards and punishments.Considering the difference of carbon emission levels in green supply chain enterprises, this paper applies game theory, two-level programming theory and optimization theory, etc.In this paper, we study the competitive situation of green supply chain with non-carbon emissions trading price and government reward and punishment, and green supply chain competition with carbon emissions trading price and government reward and punishment respectively.The model of supply chain coordination based on Stackelberg game and two-level planning is established to solve the equilibrium solution of product sales price, carbon emissions per unit product, the level of government rewards and penalties and the carbon emissions trading price.The effect of price elasticity coefficient and carbon emission reduction cost coefficient on the profit and carbon emission of each supply chain is analyzed.Through the research, we get the following conclusion: (1) the profit of the enterprise and supply chain is inversely proportional to the price elasticity coefficient and the carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and the benefit is protected by reducing the price elasticity coefficient and the carbon emission reduction cost coefficient) in the chain competition.Making decision after making decision is good for enterprise income, but making decision first is good for ensuring minimum income; making decision first is good for controlling carbon emission, and then making decision is better for improving efficiency of carbon emission reduction.) when the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction is small, the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction is lower.Government subsidies to enterprises can significantly reduce carbon emissions and financial expenditure, when enterprises carry out green technology transformation, can achieve better carbon emission reduction results at lower cost.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：X196;F274

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