河南省省管国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩相关性研究
发布时间:2018-03-10 12:27
本文选题:国有控股上市公司 切入点:高管薪酬 出处:《郑州航空工业管理学院》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:国企高管薪酬历来都是十分敏感的话题,自从被称作“限薪令”的《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》的颁布与实施,国企高管的薪酬再次成为了社会关注的焦点。公众对国企高管薪酬水平高低的纷纷议论和评判,很大程度上反映出现行国企高管薪酬的制定缺乏规范的秩序和科学的理据,国企高管薪酬体系存在着某些不合理之处。因此,对国企高管薪酬体系进行研究是推动国企高管薪酬改革实践的需要,对于解决国企高管的薪酬机制设计具有一定的现实意义。本文以河南省省管国有控股上市公司高管的薪酬为研究对象,采用2004-2015年的有关数据,通过构建多元线性回归分析模型检验了高管薪酬与企业业绩的相关性,更加清晰地揭示了河南省省管国有控股上市公司业绩型薪酬体系的完善程度。研究结果显示,河南省省管国有控股上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩间并没有建立起很好的关联效应,薪酬体系对于高管并不能发挥出有效的激励作用。然后在此基础上对高管薪酬体系的优化设计提出了合理化建议,以期为河南省深化国有企业负责人薪酬改革提供有益的参考和支持。本文的创新点主要体现在以下三个方面:第一,对河南省省管国有控股上市公司与河南省非国有控股上市公司高管的薪酬业绩关系进行了全样本的对比研究,更加客观地展现了河南省省管国有控股上市公司高管薪酬激励作用发挥的现实情况;第二,在绝对业绩评价的基础上,进一步采取相对业绩评价的方法对公司的经营业绩做出评价,避免了单纯采用净资产收益率造成的指标单一和结论不可靠;第三,突破了高管薪酬研究只关注薪酬的局限,基于系统性分析,拓展了研究思路,从改善高管的选拔机制、建立科学可行的绩效管理系统、推行全面报酬激励体制、完善公司内部治理结构以及提升高管薪酬信息的透明度等层面提出了完善和健全河南省省管国有控股上市公司高管薪酬体系与监管体制的对策和建议。
[Abstract]:The executive compensation of state-owned enterprises has always been a very sensitive topic. Since the promulgation and implementation of the "Plan for the Reform of the compensation system of Central Management Enterprises", which is called the "salary restriction order", The pay of senior executives of state-owned enterprises has once again become the focus of social attention. The public's comments and judgments on the level of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises have largely reflected the lack of normative order and scientific justifications for the establishment of executive compensation in the current state-owned enterprises. There are some unreasonable points in the executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to study the executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises in order to promote the practice of executive compensation reform in state-owned enterprises. It is of practical significance to solve the problem of executive compensation mechanism design of state-owned enterprises. This paper takes the compensation of the executives of the state-owned holding companies in Henan Province as the research object, and adopts the relevant data from 2004-2015. By constructing multiple linear regression analysis model, the correlation between executive compensation and enterprise performance is tested, and the degree of perfection of performance compensation system of state-owned holding listed companies in Henan Province is revealed more clearly. There is no good correlation between the executive compensation and the performance of the state-owned holding listed companies in Henan Province. The compensation system can not play an effective incentive role for executives. Then on the basis of this, the rational design of executive compensation system is put forward. The purpose of this paper is to provide useful reference and support for Henan Province to deepen the reform of the compensation of the responsible persons in state-owned enterprises. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following three aspects: first, This paper makes a comparative study on the relationship between the compensation performance of the executives of the provincial state-owned holding listed companies and the non-state-owned holding listed companies in Henan Province. A more objective display of Henan Province state-owned holding listed companies to play a role in the incentive role of executive compensation; second, on the basis of absolute performance evaluation, Further use the method of relative performance evaluation to evaluate the operating performance of the company, avoiding the single index and unreliable conclusion caused by the pure use of ROA. Thirdly, it breaks through the limitation that executive compensation research only pays attention to compensation. Based on systematic analysis, this paper expands the research ideas, from improving the selection mechanism of senior executives, establishing a scientific and feasible performance management system, and implementing a comprehensive reward incentive system. From the aspects of perfecting the internal corporate governance structure and enhancing the transparency of executive compensation information, this paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions for perfecting and perfecting the executive compensation system and supervision system of the state-owned holding listed companies in Henan Province.
【学位授予单位】:郑州航空工业管理学院
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F272.92;F832.51;F272.5
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