博弈视角下的城市道路拥挤税定价研究

发布时间：2018-06-17 03:16

本文选题：拥挤收费 + 外部成本　；参考：《重庆师范大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着我国城市化和机动化的快速发展，城市中道路拥挤现象日益严重，城市道路交通需求超过交通供给能力，给城市生活的魅力大打折扣。交通拥挤问题不但降低了城市的运作效率，增加了出行成本，而且严重阻碍了城市经济的发展，，成为制约我国经济发展的“瓶颈”。交通拥挤问题已引起社会的广泛关注，成为一个势在必行亟需解决的难题。交通拥挤的直接原因是道路的供给能力跟不上交通量的剧增，但是一味地满足需求，增加道路的建设，最终只会陷入建设－需求增加－再建设的恶性循环中，只会引发更深的矛盾。传统的增加道路建设的方法已经不能解决当前的交通拥挤问题。本文主要是从经济学的角度分析道路的经济学属性，以及交通拥挤产生的本质原因，阐述了交通拥挤外部性的内涵，利用边际成本理论分析了交通拥挤收费的经济学原理，并对交通拥挤的外部成本的组成部分进行量化分析，提出实行交通拥堵收费是能缓解交通拥堵的重要经济措施。论文还疏理了现阶段国内外拥挤收费理论的理论模型，总结出最优定价法和次优定价法的优缺点，并提出了从博弈的角度出发，对单条道路高峰时段政府和出行者的出行行为进行分析，找出政府调控目标、拥挤税价格、出行成本和提前出行概率之间的函数关系，并结合算例进行说明。此外论文还运用斯坦科尔伯格模型和委托代理模型对多条路径选择下的出行者行为进行分析，并结合算例来证明该模型的可行性。从论文的分析中，可以得出政府应该依据道路的交通流量，结合调控的目标流量和出行者提前出行的概率来制定合适的拥挤税价格的结论。只有制定的拥挤税价格合理，才能取得缓解交通拥堵的良好效果。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of urbanization and motorization in China, the phenomenon of road congestion in cities is becoming more and more serious. The demand for urban road traffic exceeds the capacity of traffic supply, which greatly reduces the charm of urban life. Traffic congestion not only reduces the efficiency of urban operation and increases the travel cost, but also seriously hinders the development of urban economy and becomes the "bottleneck" that restricts the economic development of our country. The problem of traffic congestion has attracted wide attention of the society and has become a difficult problem that needs to be solved urgently. The direct cause of traffic congestion is that the supply capacity of roads can not keep up with the rapid increase of traffic volume, but blindly meeting the demand and increasing the construction of roads will only lead to a vicious circle of construction-demand increase and re-construction. It will only lead to deeper conflicts. The traditional method of increasing road construction can not solve the current traffic congestion problem. This paper mainly analyzes the economic attributes of roads and the essential reasons of traffic congestion from the angle of economics, expounds the connotation of traffic congestion externality, and analyzes the economic principle of traffic congestion pricing by using marginal cost theory. Based on the quantitative analysis of the components of the external cost of traffic congestion, it is pointed out that traffic congestion charging is an important economic measure to alleviate traffic congestion. The paper also summarizes the theoretical models of congestion pricing theory at home and abroad, summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of optimal pricing method and sub-optimal pricing method, and puts forward the point of view of game theory. This paper analyzes the travel behavior of the government and the traveler in the rush hour of a single road, and finds out the functional relationship between the government control target, the price of congestion tax, the travel cost and the travel probability in advance, and illustrates it with an example. In addition, the paper also uses the Steinkelberg model and the principal-agent model to analyze the behavior of travelers under the multi-path choice, and proves the feasibility of the model with an example. From the analysis of the paper, we can draw the conclusion that the government should make the appropriate congestion tax price according to the traffic flow of the road, combined with the regulated target flow and the probability of early travel. Only when the price of congestion tax is reasonable, can good effect be achieved.
【学位授予单位】：重庆师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F224.32;F812.42;F572

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