地方龙头企业的盈余质量：关系、政治联系依赖还是市场压力？
发布时间：2018-11-09 17:39
【摘要】：自关系基础的经济社会运行规则被提出,学者们便希望找出关系基础与市场基础的种种运行机制差异及相互替代作用。然而由于变量度量等原因,迄今为止少有文献直接专注于此类研究。受Cheung、Rau和Stouraitis等(2005)研究的启发,本文认为,在关系型社会,尤其是在中国特殊的政治经济制度安排下,除了Shleifer和Vishny提出的以公司CEO或董事长的个人从政经历衡量公司政治联系的经典度量方法,公司还可以有其他方式与当地政府建立强的关系和依赖。因此本文选取对地方经济发展有重要影响的公司定义为地方龙头企业,以它们为切入点,对比关系和市场这两种相反的力量对公司盈余质量的影响。一方面,地方龙头企业与地方政府的利益绑定与关系依赖会削弱它们向市场传递良好公司治理、高质量财务信息等积极信号的动机。另一方面,来自市场的证券分析师和“四大”审计能在一定程度上约束公司的盈余管理行为,缓解信息不对称。 本文选取2003年到2012年2084家上市公司的样本,选用可操控性应计利润、异常非核心盈余和盈余反应系数度量盈余质量,研究在关系和市场的共同影响下,地方龙头企业对高质量外部审计的需求如何,其盈余质量又如何；以及何种程度的市场监督机制设计才能制衡由关系导致的公司缺乏外部取信于投资者动机的现象。 研究结果表明,地方龙头企业选择“四大”审计的概率显著低于非地方龙头企业,以可操控应计利润度量的盈余管理程度显著高于非地方龙头企业。证实了地方龙头企业与地方政府的利益绑定会削弱公司的外部取信需求。当引入分析师跟进和“四大”审计作为外部监督力量之后,本文发现,仅有证券分析师或“四大”审计不足以提高地方龙头企业的盈余质量,但此时地方龙头企业的盈余管理行为不再显著高。而当进一步区分是否地方龙头企业子样本进行研究,本文发现分析师跟进与“四大”审计的共同作用,能显著降低地方龙头企业的盈余管理程度,提高地方龙头企业的盈余质量。
[Abstract]:Since the rules of economic and social operation based on relationship have been put forward, scholars hope to find out the differences between the operation mechanism of the relationship foundation and the market basis and their mutual substitution. However, because of variable measurement and other reasons, so far few literatures have focused on this kind of research directly. Inspired by the study of Cheung,Rau and Stouraitis (2005), this paper argues that in a relational society, especially in China's special political and economic system arrangements, In addition to Shleifer and Vishny's classic measure of corporate political connections based on the company's CEO or chairman's personal political experience, companies can have other ways to build strong relationships and dependencies with local governments. Therefore, this article selects the company which has important influence to the local economic development to define as the local leading enterprise, takes them as the breakthrough point, contrasts the relationship and the market these two opposite forces to the company earnings quality influence. On the one hand, the interest binding and relationship dependence between local leading enterprises and local governments will weaken their motivation to transmit positive signals such as good corporate governance and high-quality financial information to the market. On the other hand, the securities analysts and the "Big four" audit from the market can restrain the earnings management behavior of the company to a certain extent and alleviate the information asymmetry. In this paper, 2084 listed companies from 2003 to 2012 are selected to measure earnings quality, including actionable accrual profit, abnormal non-core earnings and earnings response coefficient, under the influence of relationship and market. What is the demand of local leading enterprises for high-quality external audit, and what is the quality of their earnings; And the degree of market supervision mechanism design to counterbalance the lack of external credit to investors caused by the relationship phenomenon. The results show that the probability of selecting "four" audit by local leading enterprises is significantly lower than that of non-local leading enterprises, and the degree of earnings management with the measure of controllable accrual profits is significantly higher than that of non-local leading enterprises. Confirmed that the interests of local leading enterprises and local governments can weaken the company's external credit demand. After introducing the analyst follow-up and the "Big four" audit as the external supervisory force, this paper finds that only the securities analyst or the "Big four" audit is not enough to improve the earnings quality of the local leading enterprises. However, the earnings management behavior of local leading enterprises is no longer significantly higher. And when we further distinguish whether the sub-samples of local leading enterprises are studied, we find that the joint effect of analyst follow-up and "big four" audit can significantly reduce the degree of earnings management of local leading enterprises. Improve the surplus quality of local leading enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F276.6
本文编号：2321107
[Abstract]:Since the rules of economic and social operation based on relationship have been put forward, scholars hope to find out the differences between the operation mechanism of the relationship foundation and the market basis and their mutual substitution. However, because of variable measurement and other reasons, so far few literatures have focused on this kind of research directly. Inspired by the study of Cheung,Rau and Stouraitis (2005), this paper argues that in a relational society, especially in China's special political and economic system arrangements, In addition to Shleifer and Vishny's classic measure of corporate political connections based on the company's CEO or chairman's personal political experience, companies can have other ways to build strong relationships and dependencies with local governments. Therefore, this article selects the company which has important influence to the local economic development to define as the local leading enterprise, takes them as the breakthrough point, contrasts the relationship and the market these two opposite forces to the company earnings quality influence. On the one hand, the interest binding and relationship dependence between local leading enterprises and local governments will weaken their motivation to transmit positive signals such as good corporate governance and high-quality financial information to the market. On the other hand, the securities analysts and the "Big four" audit from the market can restrain the earnings management behavior of the company to a certain extent and alleviate the information asymmetry. In this paper, 2084 listed companies from 2003 to 2012 are selected to measure earnings quality, including actionable accrual profit, abnormal non-core earnings and earnings response coefficient, under the influence of relationship and market. What is the demand of local leading enterprises for high-quality external audit, and what is the quality of their earnings; And the degree of market supervision mechanism design to counterbalance the lack of external credit to investors caused by the relationship phenomenon. The results show that the probability of selecting "four" audit by local leading enterprises is significantly lower than that of non-local leading enterprises, and the degree of earnings management with the measure of controllable accrual profits is significantly higher than that of non-local leading enterprises. Confirmed that the interests of local leading enterprises and local governments can weaken the company's external credit demand. After introducing the analyst follow-up and the "Big four" audit as the external supervisory force, this paper finds that only the securities analyst or the "Big four" audit is not enough to improve the earnings quality of the local leading enterprises. However, the earnings management behavior of local leading enterprises is no longer significantly higher. And when we further distinguish whether the sub-samples of local leading enterprises are studied, we find that the joint effect of analyst follow-up and "big four" audit can significantly reduce the degree of earnings management of local leading enterprises. Improve the surplus quality of local leading enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F276.6
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