1943年前后美金公债舞弊案中的权力寻租
发布时间：2018-09-06 10:47
【摘要】：1943年前后,在国民政府统治中心重庆发生过一次重大的美金公债舞弊案,时任行政院长兼财政部长的孔祥熙等人利用自己的职权鲸吞近20多亿元的法币。事件曝光之后,群情哗然。面对国内民众愈演愈烈的声讨,蒋介石曾多次下令对此事进行调查,并表示自己对此事极为痛恨,但是到了调查后期,他又不得不考虑“党国的统治和家族的声誉”,陷入极度矛盾之中。最后,蒋介石还是动用了手中的权力,对社会舆论进行了严格的控制,令此事不了了之。由于国民政府自身不能对腐败行为进行彻底的惩治,使之成为了在大陆最终丧失政权的重要原因之一。尽管美金公债舞弊案已经是多年前发生在国民政府统治时期的腐败事件,,但由于中国数千年封建统治的历史文化传统的残余延续至今,在我们今天的生活环境里,仍然普遍地存在着权力寻租活动,权力寻租的结果就是贪污腐败。它对我国的政治稳定和可持续发展造成了严重损害。 权力寻租是指政府各级官员或者是企业的高层领导者,利用其手中的各项权力,避开监控、法规和审核等,以此方式去寻求且获取自己个人经济利益的一种非生产性的活动。这是古今中外一种较为普遍的经济行为。尤其是在我国经济体制转型期间,市场化改革还不够彻底,行政权力还在多方面干预社会经济活动之时,以公权进行寻租的活动一直没有消减,而且变得隐蔽起来,这引起了国人的忧心。以史为镜,本文选择了中国近代史上的一个典型的腐败案件,从权力寻租的角度对这一已成为静态的历史现象加以剖析。其目的是回答如何治理权力寻租的这一现实问题。 在当今现实社会生活中,腐败问题同样让很多国家的政府感觉到头痛,中国也不例外。腐败问题不仅严重影响了社会经济发展,同时也严重威胁着我们的党和政府的合法性。为此,我们需要探寻腐败给国家带来的危害,并寻求一种能够治理腐败的机制。在研究各种腐败问题时,寻租理论是一个重要的工具和独特的视角,有很多不同研究机构和各个学派的专家学者从很多方面对我国存在的腐败问题进行了深入研究和探讨,并且也提出了各种有见地的观点以及看法。 基于上述理由,本文将从美金公债舞弊案出发,以历史经验为借鉴,利用寻租理论这个工具,为现实构建治理腐败的机制提供建议。全文分为了三个部分,共五个章节。 第一个部分,第一章,绪论。首先,介绍了本文的研究意义,总结了前人的资料文献,并进一步提出文章内会用到的理论依据,包括寻租理论的发展过程、权力寻租的概念、信息不对称理论和层级代理关系。然后,简要叙述了文章的结构和使用的研究方法,在本部分的最后指出了文章存在的不足和创新之处。不足的地方是二手历史资料较多,无法做到完美呈现历史案例,加之个人的学术能力有限,用寻租理论对美金公债舞弊案进行分析的力度有所欠缺,深度不够。 第二个部分,包括了第二、三、四章,主要是围绕美金公债舞弊案展开论述。第二章是按照时间的先后顺序回顾了美金公债舞弊案的发生、案件调查经过和最终的处理结果。第三章是针对案件中的每个环节可能存在的权力寻租行为进行理论分析,用到的理论包括理性经济人、信息不对称、层级代理关系、权力空间和经济人选择。将美金公债舞弊案中的寻租者视为理性经济人,他们为追求个人利益最大化,利用自己的关系和权力进行寻租活动。用上述理论多角度分析个案,加强了解孔祥熙等人是如何利用权力“巧妙”地鲸吞了美金公债。在后期的调查过程中,蒋介石为了“保全党国的利益和家族的声誉”,最终选择利用自己的权力将案件强压下去,以致于案件不了了之。第四章主要研究了美金公债舞弊案中权力寻租存在的原因,以及权力寻租给国民政府统治带来了怎样的危害。本案中的孔祥熙等人在看到美金公债券的市价和黑市价的差距越变越大时,原本就怀着不良动机的他们,便会想要利用职权之便为自己谋取利益。寻租者本身就具备理性经济人特质,有追求自身利益最大化的欲望,当周围的制度无法有效监督和控制其行为时,已经缺失职业道德和自我约束的他们想要通过寻租获取利益的行为便成为了可能,用权力来满足个人私利成为了他们的最终选择。所以在美金公债舞弊案中,权力寻租存在的原因就是权力垄断,其后果便是导致国民政府的市场经济体制和社会资源被破坏,影响到政府的正常运行并导致权力滥用和腐化,最后使国民政府的信誉受损,失去民心,公信力大大降低。 第三个部分,第五章。在总结美金公债舞弊案的基础上,再与现实环境相结合,探讨权力寻租对我国可能造成的影响,并提出预防治理寻租性腐败的政策建议。权力寻租带来的直接后果包括社会公平被破坏、政府公信力下降、资源不合理配置、社会风气不良,针对种种弊端,国家需要建立一种能高效运行的权力管理机制,其目的是增加寻租成本,以减少权力寻租活动带来的政府腐败问题。
[Abstract]:Around 1943, a major US Treasury fraud occurred in Chongqing, the ruling center of the National Government. Kong Xiangxi, then the Chief Executive and Minister of Finance, and others used his power to swallow nearly 2 billion yuan of French currency. After the incident was exposed, the crowd was uproared. In the face of the growing public criticism in China, Chiang Kai-shek ordered it many times. In the end, Chiang Kai-shek used his power to control the public opinion and made it impossible for the Kuomintang government to do so. The failure to punish corruption thoroughly has made it one of the most important reasons for the eventual loss of power in the mainland. Although the US dollar bond fraud case has been a corruption incident that occurred during the period of the Kuomintang government many years ago, the remnants of the historical and cultural traditions of China's thousands of years of feudal rule continue to this day. In the living environment, power rent-seeking activities are still widespread. The result of power rent-seeking is corruption. It has caused serious damage to the political stability and sustainable development of our country.
Power rent-seeking is an unproductive activity in which government officials at all levels or senior leaders of enterprises use their powers to seek and obtain their own economic interests by avoiding supervision, regulations and auditing. It is a common economic behavior both at home and abroad, especially in China's economy. During the period of system transformation, the market-oriented reform is not thorough enough, while the administrative power is still interfering in social and economic activities in many ways, the rent-seeking activities with public power have not been reduced, and become hidden, which has aroused the concern of the Chinese people. The purpose of this paper is to answer the practical question of how to control power rent-seeking.
In today's real social life, corruption also makes many governments feel headache, China is no exception. Corruption not only seriously affects social and economic development, but also seriously threatens the legitimacy of our party and government. Therefore, we need to explore the harm of corruption to the country, and to find a way to cure it. The rent-seeking theory is an important tool and a unique perspective in the study of various corruption problems. Many experts and scholars from different research institutions and schools have conducted in-depth studies and discussions on the corruption problems in China from many aspects, and have also put forward various insights and opinions.
Based on the above reasons, this paper will proceed from the US dollar bond fraud case, draw lessons from historical experience, and use the rent-seeking theory as a tool to provide recommendations for the practical construction of corruption control mechanism. The full text is divided into three parts, a total of five chapters.
The first part, the first chapter, the introduction. First of all, this paper introduces the significance of this study, summarizes the previous literature, and further puts forward the theoretical basis used in the article, including the development process of rent-seeking theory, the concept of power rent-seeking, information asymmetry theory and Hierarchical Agency relationship. Then, it briefly describes the structure and use of the article. At the end of this part, the author points out the shortcomings and innovations of the paper. The shortcomings are that there are too many secondhand historical data to present the historical cases perfectly, and the academic ability of the individual is limited.
The second part, including the second, third and fourth chapters, mainly focuses on the U.S. Treasury fraud case. The second chapter reviews the occurrence of the U.S. Treasury fraud case in chronological order, the investigation process and the final results of the case. The third chapter discusses the power rent-seeking behavior that may exist in each link of the case. The theories used include rational economic man, information asymmetry, Hierarchical Agency relationship, power space and economic man choice. The rent-seekers in the US dollar bond fraud case are regarded as rational economic man. They use their own relationship and power to carry out rent-seeking activities in pursuit of personal interests maximization. In the latter investigation, Chiang Kai-shek chose to use his power to suppress the case so that the case could not be solved. Chapter four mainly studied the fraud of US dollar bonds. The reason for the existence of power rent-seeking in the case and the harm it does to the rule of the Kuomintang government are discussed. When the gap between the market value of US dollar bonds and the black market price becomes wider and wider, the rent-seekers, who have bad motives, will want to use their power to seek their own interests. They have the characteristics of rational economic man and the desire to maximize their own interests. When the surrounding system can not effectively supervise and control their behavior, they have lost their professional ethics and self-restraint. Their desire to obtain benefits through rent-seeking behavior becomes possible. It is their ultimate choice to use power to satisfy their personal interests. In the U.S. Treasury fraud case, the reason for power rent-seeking is power monopoly. The consequence is that the market economic system and social resources of the national government are destroyed, the normal operation of the government is affected, and the power is abused and corrupted. Finally, the credibility of the national government is damaged, and the public confidence is greatly reduced.
The third part, the fifth chapter. On the basis of summarizing the fraudulent cases of US Treasury bonds, and combining with the actual environment, this paper discusses the possible impact of power rent-seeking on China, and puts forward some policy suggestions to prevent and control rent-seeking corruption. In view of various shortcomings, the state needs to establish an efficient power management mechanism, which aims to increase rent-seeking costs and reduce the government corruption caused by power rent-seeking activities.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F129;D693
本文编号：2226120
[Abstract]:Around 1943, a major US Treasury fraud occurred in Chongqing, the ruling center of the National Government. Kong Xiangxi, then the Chief Executive and Minister of Finance, and others used his power to swallow nearly 2 billion yuan of French currency. After the incident was exposed, the crowd was uproared. In the face of the growing public criticism in China, Chiang Kai-shek ordered it many times. In the end, Chiang Kai-shek used his power to control the public opinion and made it impossible for the Kuomintang government to do so. The failure to punish corruption thoroughly has made it one of the most important reasons for the eventual loss of power in the mainland. Although the US dollar bond fraud case has been a corruption incident that occurred during the period of the Kuomintang government many years ago, the remnants of the historical and cultural traditions of China's thousands of years of feudal rule continue to this day. In the living environment, power rent-seeking activities are still widespread. The result of power rent-seeking is corruption. It has caused serious damage to the political stability and sustainable development of our country.
Power rent-seeking is an unproductive activity in which government officials at all levels or senior leaders of enterprises use their powers to seek and obtain their own economic interests by avoiding supervision, regulations and auditing. It is a common economic behavior both at home and abroad, especially in China's economy. During the period of system transformation, the market-oriented reform is not thorough enough, while the administrative power is still interfering in social and economic activities in many ways, the rent-seeking activities with public power have not been reduced, and become hidden, which has aroused the concern of the Chinese people. The purpose of this paper is to answer the practical question of how to control power rent-seeking.
In today's real social life, corruption also makes many governments feel headache, China is no exception. Corruption not only seriously affects social and economic development, but also seriously threatens the legitimacy of our party and government. Therefore, we need to explore the harm of corruption to the country, and to find a way to cure it. The rent-seeking theory is an important tool and a unique perspective in the study of various corruption problems. Many experts and scholars from different research institutions and schools have conducted in-depth studies and discussions on the corruption problems in China from many aspects, and have also put forward various insights and opinions.
Based on the above reasons, this paper will proceed from the US dollar bond fraud case, draw lessons from historical experience, and use the rent-seeking theory as a tool to provide recommendations for the practical construction of corruption control mechanism. The full text is divided into three parts, a total of five chapters.
The first part, the first chapter, the introduction. First of all, this paper introduces the significance of this study, summarizes the previous literature, and further puts forward the theoretical basis used in the article, including the development process of rent-seeking theory, the concept of power rent-seeking, information asymmetry theory and Hierarchical Agency relationship. Then, it briefly describes the structure and use of the article. At the end of this part, the author points out the shortcomings and innovations of the paper. The shortcomings are that there are too many secondhand historical data to present the historical cases perfectly, and the academic ability of the individual is limited.
The second part, including the second, third and fourth chapters, mainly focuses on the U.S. Treasury fraud case. The second chapter reviews the occurrence of the U.S. Treasury fraud case in chronological order, the investigation process and the final results of the case. The third chapter discusses the power rent-seeking behavior that may exist in each link of the case. The theories used include rational economic man, information asymmetry, Hierarchical Agency relationship, power space and economic man choice. The rent-seekers in the US dollar bond fraud case are regarded as rational economic man. They use their own relationship and power to carry out rent-seeking activities in pursuit of personal interests maximization. In the latter investigation, Chiang Kai-shek chose to use his power to suppress the case so that the case could not be solved. Chapter four mainly studied the fraud of US dollar bonds. The reason for the existence of power rent-seeking in the case and the harm it does to the rule of the Kuomintang government are discussed. When the gap between the market value of US dollar bonds and the black market price becomes wider and wider, the rent-seekers, who have bad motives, will want to use their power to seek their own interests. They have the characteristics of rational economic man and the desire to maximize their own interests. When the surrounding system can not effectively supervise and control their behavior, they have lost their professional ethics and self-restraint. Their desire to obtain benefits through rent-seeking behavior becomes possible. It is their ultimate choice to use power to satisfy their personal interests. In the U.S. Treasury fraud case, the reason for power rent-seeking is power monopoly. The consequence is that the market economic system and social resources of the national government are destroyed, the normal operation of the government is affected, and the power is abused and corrupted. Finally, the credibility of the national government is damaged, and the public confidence is greatly reduced.
The third part, the fifth chapter. On the basis of summarizing the fraudulent cases of US Treasury bonds, and combining with the actual environment, this paper discusses the possible impact of power rent-seeking on China, and puts forward some policy suggestions to prevent and control rent-seeking corruption. In view of various shortcomings, the state needs to establish an efficient power management mechanism, which aims to increase rent-seeking costs and reduce the government corruption caused by power rent-seeking activities.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F129;D693
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