成熟型企业家的融资策略与道德风险及债务积压问题

发布时间：2018-05-11 22:30

  本文选题：时间偏好不一致 + 成熟型企业家　； 参考：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年03期

【摘要】：本文假设企业家是时间偏好不一致的且属于成熟型,企业现金流服从双指数跳过程,利用资产定价理论,解析地得到了企业股权,债券价值以及最优破产水平.分析了时间偏好不一致对成熟型企业家的企业最优资本结构,破产决策以及风险转移动机和债务积压问题的影响.数值分析表明:较时间偏好一致而言,成熟企业家往往选择较小券息,较高的破产水平.时间偏好不一致减弱了成熟企业家的风险转移动机,却加剧了债务积压程度.尤其是,本文模型给出了"债务保守"之谜的一个新解释.
[Abstract]:This paper assumes that the entrepreneur is a mature enterprise with inconsistent time preference, and the cash flow of the firm jumps from the double exponential process. By using the asset pricing theory, the equity, bond value and the optimal bankruptcy level of the enterprise are obtained analytically. The effects of time preference inconsistency on the optimal capital structure, bankruptcy decision, risk transfer motivation and debt overhang of mature entrepreneurs are analyzed. Numerical analysis shows that mature entrepreneurs tend to choose smaller coupon interest and higher bankruptcy level than time preference. Time inconsistency weakens mature entrepreneurs' incentive to risk transfer, but exacerbates debt overhang. In particular, this model gives a new explanation of the mystery of "debt conservatism".
【作者单位】： 湖南大学金融与统计学院;南方科技大学金融系;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71371068,71171078,71601075)~~
【分类号】：B82-053;F275
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本文编号：1875908