论纳斯鲍姆及其能力进路对正义主体的拓展
发布时间：2018-09-01 11:58
【摘要】：纳斯鲍姆认为,罗尔斯的正义论没有考虑到残障者、国际领域以及非人类动物的正义问题,这主要是受限于他的正义理论和社会契约论传统对正义主体的理解和设定。因此,她提出了一种亚里士多德式的个人观,试图重新界定和拓展正义主体,并将尊严与能力联系起来;以此成为能力进路的基点,从而试图解决以上三个领域的正义问题。然而,纳斯鲍姆对于正义主体的界定与拓展存在诸多模糊和自相矛盾之处,她的能力进路亦并非是对罗尔斯正义理论和契约论传统的成功超越。
[Abstract]:According to Nasbaum, Rawls' theory of justice does not take into account the justice of the disabled, the international field and non-human animals, which is mainly limited by his theory of justice and the traditional understanding and setting of the subject of justice by his theory of justice and the tradition of the theory of social contract. Therefore, she puts forward a kind of Aristotelian personal view, tries to redefine and expand the subject of justice, and links dignity with ability, so as to become the basic point of the path of ability, thus trying to solve the problem of justice in the above three fields. However, Nasbaum's definition and expansion of the subject of justice has many ambiguities and contradictions, and her ability approach is not the successful transcendence of Rawls' theory of justice and the tradition of contract theory.
【作者单位】： 首都师范大学哲学系;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(14CZX049) “首都师范大学青年科研创新团队”资助
【分类号】：B82-051
本文编号：2217138
[Abstract]:According to Nasbaum, Rawls' theory of justice does not take into account the justice of the disabled, the international field and non-human animals, which is mainly limited by his theory of justice and the traditional understanding and setting of the subject of justice by his theory of justice and the tradition of the theory of social contract. Therefore, she puts forward a kind of Aristotelian personal view, tries to redefine and expand the subject of justice, and links dignity with ability, so as to become the basic point of the path of ability, thus trying to solve the problem of justice in the above three fields. However, Nasbaum's definition and expansion of the subject of justice has many ambiguities and contradictions, and her ability approach is not the successful transcendence of Rawls' theory of justice and the tradition of contract theory.
【作者单位】： 首都师范大学哲学系;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(14CZX049) “首都师范大学青年科研创新团队”资助
【分类号】：B82-051
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