重置“是”与“应当”之坐标:在哈贝马斯的伦理视域中
发布时间：2019-08-10 06:51
【摘要】："是"与"应当"的关系问题自休谟以降遂成为诸多哲学家的一个关注核心。二者或者被等而视之,或者被割裂而论,以致规范的有效性问题在二者的混淆中被消弭,道德规范的普遍性与客观性在二者的对峙中被消除。在此态势下,哈贝马斯坚守道德认知主义的立场,基于一种"类比性思维"来重置"是"与"应当"的坐标。其具体方式,一是通过对元伦理学的批判来消解"是"与"应当"之间的混同和紧张;二是基于对斯特劳森道德现象学的借镜来彰显客观化与施为性态度的分野;三是依凭对规范性命题"似真性"的开显来揭明"是"与"应当"之间的勾连。
[Abstract]:The relationship between "is" and "should" has become a core of attention of many philosophers. The two are either regarded or separated, so that the validity of the norms is eliminated in the confusion between the two, and the universality and objectivity of the moral norms are eliminated in the confrontation between the two. In this situation, Habermas adheres to the position of moral cognition and resets the coordinates of "is" and "should" based on a kind of "analogical thinking". The concrete way is to dispel the confusion and tension between "is" and "should" through the criticism of meta-ethics; second, to highlight the distinction between objective and sexual attitudes based on the mirror of Strausen's moral phenomenology; and third, to reveal the connection between "is" and "should" by opening up the normative proposition "quasi-truth".
【作者单位】： 西北大学哲学与社会学学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“哈贝马斯对话伦理学研究”(项目号:11XZX014) 陕西省教育厅人文社会科学专项资助项目(项目号:15JK1699) 西北大学哲学社会科学繁荣发展计划重大培育项目的阶段性研究成果 陕西高校人文社会科学青年英才支持计划的资助
【分类号】：B82-067
本文编号：2525040
[Abstract]:The relationship between "is" and "should" has become a core of attention of many philosophers. The two are either regarded or separated, so that the validity of the norms is eliminated in the confusion between the two, and the universality and objectivity of the moral norms are eliminated in the confrontation between the two. In this situation, Habermas adheres to the position of moral cognition and resets the coordinates of "is" and "should" based on a kind of "analogical thinking". The concrete way is to dispel the confusion and tension between "is" and "should" through the criticism of meta-ethics; second, to highlight the distinction between objective and sexual attitudes based on the mirror of Strausen's moral phenomenology; and third, to reveal the connection between "is" and "should" by opening up the normative proposition "quasi-truth".
【作者单位】： 西北大学哲学与社会学学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“哈贝马斯对话伦理学研究”(项目号:11XZX014) 陕西省教育厅人文社会科学专项资助项目(项目号:15JK1699) 西北大学哲学社会科学繁荣发展计划重大培育项目的阶段性研究成果 陕西高校人文社会科学青年英才支持计划的资助
【分类号】：B82-067
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