破解联合国气候变化谈判的困局——基于不完全契约理论的视角
发布时间：2018-12-07 08:20
【摘要】：当前,联合国气候变化谈判步履维艰,这在一定程度上凸显了其制度安排的匮乏。因此,为实现全球温室气体减排的目标,联合国气候变化谈判亟须拓展必要的制度创新。而契约经济学中不完全契约理论的前沿成果,无疑有助于揭开联合国气候变化谈判的过程本质,并在一定意义上为未来气候变化制度安排提供一种新的理论旨趣。对此,在联合国气候变化谈判中,中国应强化对程序性事项的考量,在碳排放的制度设计中密切关注产权安排;同时,在有效防范制度设计对中国套牢的前提下,应尽可能多地拓展中国气候变化谈判的剩余控制权。
[Abstract]:The UN climate change negotiations are struggling, partly underscoring the lack of institutional arrangements. Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the United Nations climate change negotiations need to expand the necessary institutional innovation. The frontier achievement of incomplete contract theory in contract economics is undoubtedly helpful to uncover the essence of the UN climate change negotiation process and to provide a new theoretical purport for the future climate change institutional arrangement. Therefore, in the United Nations climate change negotiations, China should strengthen the consideration of procedural issues and pay close attention to the property rights arrangement in the design of carbon emission system. At the same time, under the premise of the effective prevention system design, we should expand the residual control right of climate change negotiation.
【作者单位】： 山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“欧美新能源立法的制度性设计及中国的路径选择研究”(11CFX069) 中国法学会部级课题“德班平台下应对气候变化单轨制安排的法律问题研究”(CLS(2013)D225)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D815;X2
本文编号：2366897
[Abstract]:The UN climate change negotiations are struggling, partly underscoring the lack of institutional arrangements. Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the United Nations climate change negotiations need to expand the necessary institutional innovation. The frontier achievement of incomplete contract theory in contract economics is undoubtedly helpful to uncover the essence of the UN climate change negotiation process and to provide a new theoretical purport for the future climate change institutional arrangement. Therefore, in the United Nations climate change negotiations, China should strengthen the consideration of procedural issues and pay close attention to the property rights arrangement in the design of carbon emission system. At the same time, under the premise of the effective prevention system design, we should expand the residual control right of climate change negotiation.
【作者单位】： 山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“欧美新能源立法的制度性设计及中国的路径选择研究”(11CFX069) 中国法学会部级课题“德班平台下应对气候变化单轨制安排的法律问题研究”(CLS(2013)D225)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D815;X2
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