康熙三十年陕西西安、凤翔府荒政及其应对

发布时间：2018-05-02 12:22

本文选题：康熙三十年 + 西安　；参考：《华中师范大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：西安、凤翔府地处陕西北部,自然地理条件恶劣,灾害发生频繁。康熙三十年,西安、凤翔二府发生了严重的旱灾,导致饿殍遍野,百姓饥荒流移,农业生产锐减,给当地社会造成了恶劣的影响。究其原因,有自然环境和社会人文环境的双重作用。陕西西安、凤翔府发生灾害以后,以康熙皇帝为核心的清朝政府提出了一系列救济灾害的措施并实践着,如康熙皇帝自省、调遣官员查勘、豁免钱粮、安抚流民、邻省协作运输粮食等。但这些措施多为口头政策,没有明确成文。在缺乏灾害监督机制的情况下,政府官员在落实救灾政策时并不到位,弊端丛生。面对突如其来的旱灾,陕西西安、凤翔地方政府并没有采取切实有效的赈济政策,而是消极等待、各自为阵、以邻为壑,导致灾害影响扩大化。邻省的湖广襄阳的地方官员俞森,在协济中的态度和行为比较复杂,显得有些被动。在饥荒赈济中他由最初的置之不理,空有想法的状态转变为后来的积极救济。他不敢违抗中央的旨意,因此他的救济行为在中央政府的明文规定和灾害的具体情况之间徘徊、调停。最终目的是维护襄阳地方社会的秩序,控制当地社会。在此次灾害中,民间力量的自发救济不容忽视。西安、凤翔的当地百姓和绅士们参与到了灾害赈济中。但就赈济的效果来看,被灾百姓和绅士的救济能力非常薄弱,他们的救济行为多数是自发的,零零散散,没有聚合起来形成一个有效的团体。因而,他们的救济对整个赈灾所起的作用微不足道,赈济的成效并不大。在康熙三十年西安、凤翔府的灾荒实践中,我们欣慰地看到了在清朝初期,中央政府在饥荒赈济中处于领导地位。但由于财力有限,中央政府在赈济中将权力下放给地方政府,期望地方政府在灾害赈济中发挥主导作用来缓解中央的压力。然而,地方政府在缺乏有效监督的情况下,吏治败坏,财政拮据。由于交通等客观因素和自身利益等主观因素的制约,在邻省协济中,邻省地方官员之间并没有积极主动地沟通和联系,贻误了协作赈济的大好时机,赈济政策没有落到实处,赈济的效率大打折扣。因此,在赈济中,中央政府要及时有效的监督地方政府的赈济,邻省政府之间也要抛开地方保护主义的成见,通力合作。只有监督和合作两者兼顾,赈济才是有效率的,长久的,双赢的。
[Abstract]:Xi'an, Fengxiang House is located in the north of Shaanxi Province, natural geographical conditions are harsh, frequent disasters. After 30 years of Kangxi, Xi'an and Fengxiang had a severe drought, resulting in famine and famine, and a sharp decline in agricultural production, which had a bad impact on the local society. Investigate its reason, have the dual function of natural environment and social humanities environment. After the disaster in Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, the Qing government, with Emperor Kangxi as the core, put forward a series of measures to relieve the disaster and put them into practice. For example, Emperor Kangxi introspected himself, sent officials to investigate, exempted money and grain, and appeased the displaced. Neighboring provinces cooperate to transport grain and so on. However, these measures are mostly verbal policies and are not clearly documented. In the absence of disaster supervision mechanism, government officials do not implement the disaster relief policy in place. In the face of the sudden drought, the local governments in Xi'an and Fengxiang of Shaanxi Province did not take effective relief policies, but waited passively for each side to make a beggar-thy-neighbour, resulting in the expansion of the disaster impact. Yu Sen, a local official in Huguang Xiangyang, a neighboring province, is more complex and passive in his attitude and behavior. In famine relief, he turned from an initial, thoughtful state to a later positive relief. He did not dare to disobey the central government's will, so his relief wanders between the central government's provisions and the specific circumstances of the disaster. The ultimate aim is to maintain the order of Xiangyang local society and control the local society. In this disaster, the spontaneous relief of folk forces can not be ignored. In Xi'an, Fengxiang's local people and gentlemen took part in the disaster relief. But as far as the effect of relief is concerned, the relief ability of the affected people and gentlemen is very weak. Most of their relief actions are spontaneous and scattered, and they do not gather together to form an effective group. As a result, their relief to the whole disaster relief plays a negligible role, relief effectiveness is not great. In Kangxi Xi'an, Fengxiang government famine practice, we are pleased to see that in the early Qing Dynasty, the central government in famine relief in the leading position. But because of limited financial resources, the central government devolved power to local governments in the relief effort, hoping that local governments would play a leading role in disaster relief to ease the central pressure. However, the local government in the absence of effective supervision, corruption, financial constraints. Because of the constraints of objective factors such as transportation and subjective factors such as self-interest, in the neighboring provinces, local officials did not actively communicate and communicate with each other, thus delaying the good opportunity for cooperation in relief, and the relief policy did not materialize. The efficiency of relief is greatly reduced. Therefore, in the relief, the central government should supervise the relief of local governments in time and effectively, and the neighboring provincial governments should put aside the preconceptions of local protectionism and cooperate with each other. Only when supervision and cooperation are taken into account can relief be efficient, long-lasting and win-win.
【学位授予单位】：华中师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D632.5;K249

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