互惠互利抑或相互性——能力缺陷问题与罗尔斯契约论的前提承诺

发布时间：2018-05-21 02:19

本文选题：可行能力思路 + 契约论　；参考：《道德与文明》2013年03期

【摘要】：可行能力思路认为,罗尔斯式的社会契约论假定公民的能力处于正常范围,从而把具有严重能力缺陷的人排除在正义原则的选择者与受益者之外了。它们将此归咎为这种契约论对互惠互利的预先承诺。事实上,在罗尔斯后期的契约论构造当中,互惠互利既不是主导性的预设,也不是其主导性预设的一个构成部分。相反,由理性与合情理性一起共同塑造的相互性理念构成了这种正义理论由以确立的规范性前提。否定互惠互利的理念,不仅有利于我们准确理解罗尔斯的契约论,而且对于我们反思契约论传统是否仍然具备足够的包容性潜力去应对现代社会正义问题,都将提供一个新的解释视角。
[Abstract]:According to the idea of feasible ability, Rawls' social contract theory assumes that citizens' ability is in the normal range, thus excluding the people with serious ability defects from the choice and beneficiary of the principle of justice. They blame this as a prior commitment to mutual benefit. In fact, in the latter part of Rawls' contract theory, mutual benefit is neither a dominant presupposition nor a component of its dominant presupposition. On the contrary, the mutual idea which is shaped by rationality and reasonable rationality together constitutes the normative premise of this kind of justice theory. Negating the idea of mutual benefit not only helps us to understand Rawls's contract theory accurately, but also helps us to reflect on whether the tradition of contract theory still has enough inclusive potential to deal with the problem of modern social justice. Will provide a new perspective of interpretation.
【作者单位】：中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院;中山大学中国公共管理研究中心;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJC720030) 中山大学“985工程”三期建设项目
【分类号】：D09

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